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1 Preface: The New Paradigm 
One way to begin to build the needed apparatus is to use the following approach: to rethink the 
nature of nature based on our best scientific theories, while rethinking the nature of scientific 
practices in terms of our best understanding of the nature of nature and our best social theories, 
while rethinking our best social theories in terms of our best understanding of the nature of nature 
and the nature of scientific theories. 1 
 
 
This book is about the formation of a discourse on images that has been waiting in the 
wings for some time. A wider context for the emergence of this discourse is the 
crumbling of a system of thought that is called metaphysics. That this linear and 
historical model of comprehending the world is being replaced by a new paradigm 
ushered in by a constellation of accelerated developments that can be variously 
described as ‘algorithmic’, ‘ecological’, ‘new-materialist’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘holistic’ 
is generally recognized. What is less well understood is how this departure from the 
representational discourse affects the photographic image. A belief still lingers in the 
ability of the photograph to represent people, events and situations, in its power to aid 
recognition, memory, description and archiving, as if these powers can be retained 
independently from the new discursive practices that are driven by algorithmic, 
neurological and quantum models.  
Perhaps it is because we are so used to placing great trust in photography’s ability 
to describe reality truthfully, to represent it faithfully and to report it accurately that we 
grew accustomed to believing that these powers of representation and description are 
somehow outside the movement of history and time, giving us a universal power of 
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comprehension that is immune to the failures of our own limited experience. In 
allowing ourselves to be persuaded that our cognitive skills place us above our own 
human, fallible and mortal nature, we became a little like gods, and the ability to 
represent the world as a picture is for us more than a way of seeing – it became akin to 
theology, i.e. something larger than the finite trajectory of human life that bestows on it 
universal and eternal values of ‘truth’, ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’. 
And yet, this understanding of photography as a reliable representational 
mechanism cannot be reconciled with what we now know about the world and 
ourselves. Briefly stated, these new understandings are: first, the centrality to 
contemporary culture of generative algorithms introduces elements of undecidability, 
randomness and unpredictability into all aspects of life.2 Second, new insights into the 
structure of the brain suggest that the higher brain functions (i.e. rationality) cannot 
operate independently from instincts, desires and gut responses, overturning the 
Cartesian intuition that rationality and emotion can be spilt asunder.3 And third, the 
new conception of matter that is derived from quantum physics indicates that matter is 
not solid, independent and self-contained, but can be better described as an 
entanglement between bodies and techniques, organic and inorganic, artificial and 
natural, mind and body.4 
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At bottom, these new models reject the foundational premises of the Western 
tradition: subject-object, image-thing, form-content, identity-difference, substance-
essence. What replaces these notions is not a single unified theory but a constellation of 
loosely connected developments that reject the belief in the existence of an ‘objective 
reality’ that exists independently of our attempts to grasp, picture, modify and analyze 
it. These developments are incompatible with the representational model of knowledge, 
which grounds truth in the ability of the mind to produce legible images of fixed and 
knowable nature. In every case, hierarchical structures of control-and-command give 
way to disjointed and fragmented processes driven by artificial intelligence, random 
and contingent assemblages, and automated models of decision making. 
1.1 Genealogy of representation 
The representational model is based on a twofold principle that underwrites most 
knowledge systems of Western civilization. The first part is drawing a limit, a dividing 
line between two kinds of entities: theoretical (spiritual) and material (corporeal). This 
is a fundamental (but ultimately false) distinction between what something is and how 
it is described. The word apple describes a fruit with crisp and sweet flesh ( ), but the 
word apple cannot be bitten into, even though both apple and  mean the same thing. 
Images and objects are forever conceptually separated and belong to different 
categories: images are clones of objects, never the other way around. There is no grey 
area, no twilight zone that permits the existence of entities that are part matter and part 
spirit. Form and content are not only conceptually separated, they are also defined in 
opposition to each other, so an image is that which is not an object and an object is that 
which is not an image. In the same way that Newtonian (classical) physics considers 
mass and energy as separate and categorically different entities, representation 
understands the image as absolutely and ontologically distinct from an object. The 
second part of the representation principle establishes a fixed standard that is shared by 
all the disciplines and all the faculties of human perception. For while representation 
admits that change happens, the one thing that never changes is representation itself. 
For that reason, there is a hierarchy and stability in the representational model that is 
universal, ahistorical and eternal.  
Because representation is so deeply woven into the flesh of the Western subject it 
is more than a methodology, it is his methadone. Marx famously remarked that religion 
is the opium of the people, but he forgot to add that representation is their legal high. 
Indeed, the socio-political function of representation is not dissimilar to that of religion: 
both establish a hierarchy, a given-once-and-for-all order, an eternity of clones destined 
to repeat the same thing over and over again. It is not an accident that Immanuel Kant 
offers representation as the mechanism that will free men from the bondage of the 
Middle Ages, for representation holds the keys to knowledge that does not require the 
authority of god, the priest or the good book.5 However, representation is capable of 
this accomplishment because – like religion – it situates an external authority that men 
must abide by. Because it is invisible, tasteless and odorless, limitless and universal, 
representation commands respect as the law of the land, the totality that nothing is 
exempt from. As the basic premise of classical science, representation implies 
objectivity and disinterested observation guaranteed on the one hand by a clear-cut 
separation between the scientist and the object of study – so the scientist’s own material 
conditions do not affect investigation – and on the other by an assumed neutrality that 
allows the scientist to assert the universality of ‘his’ findings.6  
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Upheld by the conviction that the images and things belong to two ontologically 
distinct categories, the belief in the objectivity of representation reigned supreme until 
the appearance of photography in the 19th century, which presented metaphysics with 
an impossible conundrum: an image that is both distinct from and continuous with an 
object. According to the Platonic, Aristotelian and even Newtonian models of 
knowledge, a chimera like this cannot exist. To say otherwise is to declare that mass 
and energy are somehow one and the same thing (as Einstein did in joining them as E = 
mc2 – energy equals mass by speed of light squared – in 1905). Suddenly, the Platonic 
theory of knowledge – the 2,000-year-old fable of the cave (the sensual world is an 
illusion, true knowledge is accessible only to reason) – caved in, and the shadows on 
the walls of the cave started to mingle with objects as they appear in broad daylight. 
Plato’s cave gave way to the photographic exposure, which merges darkness with a 
flash of lightning in one techno-poetically enabled instant. Despite the superficial 
similarity between Plato’s cave and the photographic darkroom, photography suggested 
a radically different model of knowledge, for here the materiality of the photographic 
process is written directly into the image in such a way that the sensual and the rational, 
the process and the image are fully entangled and indivisible. The conceptual, the 
physical, the social and the sensual are all mixed together in the outlandish moment of 
photographic exposure, overturning the metaphysical principle of the separate 
disciplines in charge of ideas (philosophy), matter (physics), society (ethics) and sense 
(aesthetics). The binary split between the conceptual and the material, which 
guaranteed the objectivity of the representational method, is destroyed by the 
photograph, for here the material and the conceptual are one and the same. In other 
words, the  is not more real than the photograph of an apple, for at the last count, 
both  and apple are symbolic avatars of mass/energy. The fruit does not pre-exist its 
image, rather it comes into existence by the act of naming it. The image is raised to the 
dignity of a ‘thing’, and representation is revealed as a particularly persuasive 
conspiracy theory aimed at maintaining the fiction that ‘reality’ has an existence 
independent from our image of it. Through photography we come to appreciate the 
words of the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides (b. around 515 BC), ‘Thinking and 
Being are the same thing.’7  
It is precisely because photography is both ‘thinking and Being’, i.e. an 
objectifying process and a material presence, that it is at one and the same time the 
fullest expression of the logic of representation and the very limit beyond which it 
cannot go. Photography does more than represent reality – it modifies our conception of 
the real as solid and intransient into a global network of self-replicating nodal points.  
1.2 From production to information 
It should hardly come as a surprise that photography can shed light on the deepest and 
most dramatic paradigm shift that befell Western society, because its invention 
coincides with the moment when said society moved from being invested in modifying 
the world (the problem of labour and machines) to being invested in information (the 
problem of thought and artificial intelligence).  
Since its invention in the 19th century, the photographic image gave visual 
expression to the idea of ‘immaterial labour’ that is oriented not towards the 
modification of spatial-temporal reality (the world of work), but towards the production 
of information (data processing).8 It has done so by showing what happens to the real 
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once it is placed inside a ‘black box’ – the photographic camera being its first instance 
and the prototype of all the black boxes that followed on from it.  
Whether a camera or a computer, a black box is a device with an input and an 
output. If you feed data into a black box, it will be output as information.9 Significantly, 
the kind of information that the black box outputs depends not on the kind of data that 
it is being fed, but on the kind of invisible processing that is taking place inside it. In 
the case of the digital camera, for instance, it is an entirely arbitrary decision that the 
data that is placed within the camera is being output as a picture that has visual 
resemblance to the object in front of the lens. What the camera outputs is determined 
not by the object that is being photographed but by the authors of the code that instructs 
the algorithms how to process the input data. The same packet of data could be output 
not as an image file but as a sound, a text file, as a string of numbers, or it could be left 
unprocessed.10 It is therefore not essential for a photograph to exist as a visual image. 
In parenthesis, it is salutary to mention that black boxing is not unique to digital 
photography. Traditional analogue photographs are also the outcome of a process that 
computes the real and outputs it as information. The operations that take place inside 
the photographic darkroom are not in principle different from the operations of 
algorithms, and any deviation from the executable programme (changes to the 
chemistry, temperature or order of operations) results in an output with different 
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material qualities – a point that is completely lost on the believers in the so-called 
indexicality of photography.  
Appearing as innocuous pictures on our smartphones and tablets, these 
photographic skeuomorphs are harbingers of a revolution in information technology in 
which the homey familiarity of photographs is used to algorithmically manipulate our 
own identities by exploiting our weaknesses and weaponising our selves against 
ourselves. Yet precisely because photography is a black box that produces an image, 
and therefore establishes connections between algorithms and human emotions, desires, 
thoughts and feelings, it is capable of shedding light on the manipulative power of 
computation.  
The digital code that streams through the algorithmic structures and the 
computational assemblages that dominate contemporary life is for the most part 
invisible and inaccessible to our comprehension. Yet, in photography this entwined 
entity that effortlessly merges code and thought, feedback loops and emotions, data 
processing and action is presented as an image, and therefore it makes graspable the 
internal logic of a new layer of consciousness that corresponds to the societal shift from 
production to information.  
As developments in computational intelligence, neuroscience and quantum 
physics begin to influence and communicate with each other, it becomes apparent that 
photography is a linchpin of many of these processes. It also emerges that a quest for a 
positive definition of photography that is cognizant with new perspectives on space and 
time as continuous, and with intelligence (artificial or otherwise) as fundamentally 
irrational, is urgently required to understand the cultural and political composition of 
contemporary life. 
1.3 Fragmentation of Photography  
In the broadest terms, this book explores the impact of the disintegration of the 
representational world view on photography. Succinctly put, it maps a transition from 
what can be called ‘traditional theories of photography’ to a new approach that diverts 
from the persistent focus on the rationality of the optical image and in so doing 
prepares a way of encountering photography not as a visual image but as a new way of 
inhabiting the immaterial materiality of the contemporary augmented reality11. The 
critique of the traditional view of photography can be summarized in three points. First, 
the traditional view is narrow, in the sense that it engages with only a small number of 
actual photographic practices, often ignoring the uses of photography that fall outside 
of its conception as an aesthetic practice. Second, it is optical, in as much as it 
understands photography as an act of light writing, attributing to it signifying and 
aesthetic qualities, forgetting that many photographic operations, practices and events 
are inaccessible to human vision and do not exist as an image. And third, it is parochial 
because, while photographs and photographic techniques are widely used in everything 
from law enforcement and medical research to the study of antimatter and cosmic 
radiation,12 traditional photographic theory does not for the most part relate to other 
disciplines in the sense that it does not contribute to them and does not learn from them. 
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This book does not aspire to become the new definitive or normative code for the 
deciphering of images; its aim is not to replace the discourse of the Index with 
something more up to date. Rather, this book encourages the reader to think through 
images in a way that changes both images and thoughts. To think about images in ways 
that are not indebted to representational thinking requires paying close attention not 
only to the concerns of thought, but also to the manner, style and timbre of thought. At 
stake is the possibility of communication that does not rely on the normative values of 
correspondence and truth.  
In the digital age, a photograph is no more a representation of the world than a 
URL is a representation of online content. The URL does not signify, nor can it be true 
or false; rather, what we need to know of a URL is whether it is working or broken. To 
say the same thing slightly differently, the Internet did not abolish the notion of truth, 
nor did it substitute it with a post-truth; instead, it has shown that the meaning of truth 
is interlinked with the technological paradigm of the age. Contemporary culture, its 
disciplines and discourses are replete with references to and uses of photography. Yet, 
despite the significance of photography for the construction of the fabric of social, 
political and scientific reality, photography studies for the most part tend to focus on 
the aesthetics of the image without reference to the expanded visual field that is 
continually mined by a broad range of disciplines. One of the aims of this book is to 
address this critical deficit by providing a snapshot of photography’s engagement with 
the contemporary environment. Instead of the traditional approach of assuming that 
photography is determined ultimately by representation (sometimes also referred to as 
index, document, punctum or archive), this book suggests that photography is a rich 
interdisciplinary field that transcends the traditional boundaries of visual studies, 
aesthetics and media.  
This book is raising the question of what becomes of photography when its 
presumed visuality is augmented by cultural artefacts produced by computation, 
randomness, automated processing and incompleteness. Because to see photography in 
terms of the traditions of visual culture, with all their ocular-centric, perspectival and 
representational baggage, is to ignore the fact that photography is not only an image, it 
is also a slice of the ‘real’ that the age of present-day technology is made of. The 
photograph is at one and the same time absolutely technological and visual. It is not 
only a visual medium but also the possibility of grasping the sensual ‘now’ of the 
information age.  
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